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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Dung Bui (“Bui”) appeals from the District Court’s 
order denying his petition seeking habeas corpus relief, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we find that Bui’s trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance.  Therefore, we will grant Bui’s petition, vacate the 
District Court’s order, and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
I. Background Facts 
 This matter originated as an investigation into a 
conspiracy involving the cultivation and distribution of 
marijuana.  Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 
agents executed a search warrant at multiple residences in the 
Reading, Pennsylvania area.  Agents arrested Bui at 1307 
Lorraine Road, Reading, Pennsylvania based on his 
involvement in the conspiracy.  After his arrest, Bui 
“admitted to the agents that the only reason they purchased 
that house was to . . . convert it into a marijuana grow factory 
. . . .”  (J.A. 230) 
 Bui was indicted on four drug-related counts: (1) 
conspiracy to manufacture more than 1,000 marijuana plants, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) manufacturing, as well as 
aiding and abetting the manufacturing, of more than 100 
marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2; (3) using the house at 1307 Lorraine Road to 
manufacture and to distribute marijuana, pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); and (4) manufacturing and distributing 
marijuana “within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising 
Hampden Park, Reading, Pennsylvania, an athletic field 
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owned and operated by the Reading School District,” (J.A. 
33), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a)
1
 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.   
 Bui pled guilty to counts one and four as part of a plea 
agreement.  The plea agreement detailed the statutory 
maximum sentences as well as mandatory minimum 
sentences.  In the plea agreement, the parties also stipulated 
that the property at 1307 Lorraine Road “was located within 
1000 feet of Hampden Park, an athletic field owned and 
operated by the Reading School District, and therefore the 
defendant’s base offense level should be increased two 
level[s] pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1) . . . .”  (J.A. 45.) 
 According to Bui, he pled guilty because his counsel 
told him he would receive a reduced sentence by doing so.  
Not only did Bui assert counsel told him about the possibility 
of a lower sentence if he pled guilty, he stated that both 
before and after the guilty plea, his counsel told other family 
members that Bui was eligible for a reduced sentence 
pursuant to the “safety valve.”2  
Consistent with these statements, prior to the sentencing 
hearing, Bui’s counsel filed a motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
 
1
 Although the superceding indictment states that Bui’s 
actions were “[i]n violation of” 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), that 
statute, rather than establishing a new violation, simply 
enhances the penalty for violations of § 841(a) and § 856.   
 
 
2
 Generally, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 is referred to as the 
“safety valve” provision. 
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3553(f), seeking a sentence reduction.  At the sentencing 
hearing, counsel withdrew this motion, explaining that United 
States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 1996) established 
that § 3553(f) did not apply to convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 
860.  Bui was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 
months of imprisonment and 120 months of supervised 
release.
3
   
 In his pro se habeas petition, Bui raises multiple 
claims.  He argues that: (1) his guilty plea was not voluntary 
or knowing because it was induced by the misrepresentations 
of his counsel; (2) his counsel’s erroneous advice on the 
safety valve provision constituted ineffective assistance; (3) 
the District Court erred by accepting Bui’s guilty plea, 
because there was a lack of factual support with respect to 
whether Hampden Park was a school; and (4) his counsel also 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to explain the 
factual predicate for violation of § 860(a).
4
   
                                                 
 
3
 Bui did not file an appeal of his sentence. 
 
4
  Bui’s habeas petition focused on the argument that 
Hampden Park is not a playground.  In its response, the 
government stated that “[t]he indictment does not allege that 
Hampden Park is a playground.”  (Appellee Br. 15 n.1.)  
Instead, the government noted that the athletic fields at 
Hampden Park are used as part of Reading High School and 
thus comprise part of the school, regardless of the ownership 
issue.  In his reply, Bui argued that Hampden Park could not 
qualify as school property because the land was jointly owned 
between the City of Reading and the Reading School District.  
Now, on appeal, Bui’s argument focuses solely on the fact 
that Hampden Park is not real property comprising Reading 
High School because of its joint ownership.  He claims that, 
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 The District Court found that Bui’s guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary.  Thus, the collateral-attack waiver 
provision of the plea agreement was enforceable.  As to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the District Court held 
that the “exhaustive change of plea hearing remedied any 
alleged errors committed by Bui’s counsel . . . .”  (J.A. 9.)  
Therefore, the District Court ruled that Bui failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice, as required by Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The District Court also 
held that Hampden Park qualified as a school “under the 
broad language of § 860(a) . . . .”  (J.A. 10.)  The District 
Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, stating that “the 
record conclusively shows that Bui is not entitled to relief for 
all the reasons discussed . . . .”  (J.A. 11.)   
 Our Court granted Bui’s request for a certificate of 
appealability on the issue of “whether Bui’s attorney 
committed ineffective assistance by advising him to plead 
guilty to 21 U.S.C. § 860, and whether, if Bui’s counsel [had] 
provided ineffective assistance, the collateral waiver in Bui’s 
plea agreement is enforceable as to that claim.”5  (J.A. 13.)  
                                                                                                             
had his attorney explained the nature of Hampden Park and 
the elements of § 860, he would not have pled guilty.   
 
 
5
  The Government has not sought to enforce the 
collateral waiver, acknowledging that “Bui’s appeal rises or 
falls on the basis of his claim that he should be relieved of his 
guilty plea, which included the waiver.”  (Appellee Br. 5.)      
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Upon granting the request for Bui’s certificate of 
appealability, our Court appointed counsel for Bui.  Bui’s 
appointed counsel sought to withdraw based on his view that 
there were no nonfrivolous issues to appeal, pursuant to 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We permitted 
counsel to withdraw from the case, but appointed new 
counsel to represent Bui.  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253.  “In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we 
exercise plenary review of the district court’s legal 
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to the 
court’s factual findings.  We review the District Court’s 
denial of an evidentiary hearing in a habeas case for abuse of 
discretion.”  United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
III. Analysis 
 Bui argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by incorrectly advising him about the availability 
and applicability of the safety valve sentencing provision and 
by failing to advise him about available defenses to the § 860 
enhancement due to the existence of debatable evidence with 
respect to the question of Hampden Park being a school.   
 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to evaluate 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The first part of the 
Strickland test requires “showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
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guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 
687 (internal citations omitted).  The second part specifies 
that the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  We have reasoned 
that “there can be no Sixth Amendment deprivation of 
effective counsel based on an attorney’s failure to raise a 
meritless argument.”  United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248, 
253 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 The year after deciding Strickland, the Supreme Court 
slightly modified the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in 
connection with guilty pleas.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52 (1985).  “In order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, 
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Id. at 59 
(internal quotations omitted).  The Court has re-emphasized 
that “[d]efendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process.”  Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).   
 When addressing a guilty plea, counsel is required to 
give a defendant enough information “‘to make a reasonably 
informed decision whether to accept a plea offer.’”  Shotts v. 
Wetzel, 724 F.3d 364, 376 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United 
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1340 (2014).  We have identified potential 
sentencing exposure as an important factor in the 
decisionmaking process, stating that “[k]nowledge of the 
comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and 
accepting a plea offer will often be crucial to the decision 
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whether to plead guilty.”  Day, 969 F.2d at 43.  In order to 
provide this necessary advice, counsel is required “to know 
the Guidelines and the relevant Circuit precedent . . . .”  
United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2003).  
However, “an erroneous sentencing prediction by counsel is 
not ineffective assistance of counsel where . . . an adequate 
plea hearing was conducted.”  United States v. Shedrick, 493 
F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 Here, the record clearly indicates Bui’s counsel 
provided him with incorrect advice regarding the availability 
of a sentencing reduction, pursuant to § 3553(f).  In addition 
to Bui’s statements regarding counsel’s representations to 
him, there is the fact that counsel filed a motion pursuant to § 
3553(f), the basis for which he apparently did not research 
until immediately before the sentencing hearing.  (J.A. 204.)  
That research revealed our longstanding precedent that § 
3553(f) does not apply to convictions under § 860.  Counsel’s 
lack of familiarity with an eighteen-year-old precedent and 
his erroneous advice based on that lack of familiarity 
demonstrate counsel’s performance fell below prevailing 
professional norms required by Smack and Strickland.  See 
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) (“An 
attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to 
his case combined with his failure to perform basic research 
on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable 
performance under Strickland.”). 
 Unlike the majority of guilty plea cases, the District 
Court’s plea colloquy here did not serve to remedy counsel’s 
error.  Rather than correcting counsel’s mistaken advice, 
several statements that the District Judge made during the 
plea colloquy serve to reinforce counsel’s incorrect advice.  
For example, the District Judge stated that “[i]f I determine to 
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apply the Guidelines in your case, the Sentencing Guidelines 
permit me to depart upwards or downwards under some 
circumstances . . . .”  (J.A. 121-22)  Additionally, the District 
Judge asked Bui if he understood that “[his] attorney and the 
Government attorney can agree on facts and they can make 
recommendations and motions and requests of me at the time 
of sentencing, but I don’t have to do what they ask me to do 
. . . .”  (J.A. 125.)   
 These statements, albeit reasonable and accurate 
statements under normal circumstances, are problematic here.  
Any statement by the District Court about sentencing 
discretion creates confusion here because the mandatory 
minimum would limit the exercise of its discretion.  Further, 
these statements indicating the District Court had discretion 
to vary from the mandatory minimum serve to reinforce the 
erroneous advice provided by counsel regarding the 
availability of the safety valve reduction.  
 During the proceedings, the District Judge never stated 
that Bui was ineligible for the safety valve reduction due to 
his decision to plead guilty to the §860 offense.  Although the 
District Judge did correctly inform Bui that “I could award 
you two terms of life imprisonment but I must award a 
mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment” (J.A. 119), 
this single sentence did not serve to overcome the erroneous 
advice of counsel in light of the other statements supporting 
counsel’s advice.  Thus, Bui has satisfied the first prong of 
the Strickland test.   
 Bui has also satisfied the second prong of the 
Strickland test by asserting that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  
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Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  In addition to Bui’s statement that he 
would not have pled guilty, logic supports his assertion.  If 
Bui were unable to benefit from a safety valve reduction, he 
would have gained no benefit from his plea agreement.  
Although the Government agreed to drop counts two and 
three, these charges were lesser-included offenses, the 
elimination of which did not impact Bui’s sentencing 
exposure.  Bui has demonstrated prejudice, thus satisfying the 
second prong of the Strickland test.
6
   
 Since we conclude that Bui’s counsel was ineffective 
with respect to his advice regarding the applicability of § 
3553(f) and are thus granting his habeas petition on that 
ground, we need not address Bui’s second claim — that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the factual 
basis for the § 860 offense.  Cf. Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 
403-04 (3d Cir. 1997).  We do note that it appears, based on 
the extensive arguments set forth by counsel on appeal, that 
both factual and legal issues exist as to whether Hampden 
Park is “real property comprising a public . . .  secondary 
school . . . .”  21 U.S.C. § 860(a).  We leave the resolution of 
these questions to the District Court to address on remand.  
IV. Conclusion 
 On the facts before us, we conclude there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Bui 
                                                 
 
6
 Given the evidence available on the record before us, 
we do not believe remand for an evidentiary hearing is 
required.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 
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would not have pled guilty.  We will grant Bui’s habeas 
petition, vacate the District Court’s order, and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Upon remand, the District Court shall determine whether 
Hampden Park is properly classified as real property 
comprising a school.   
 
